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Abstract
Mass atrocity invokes humanitarian impulses in all of us. But when a genocidaire casts
himself as a victim, the right response is less straightforward. This article analyzes a recent
hearing of one of Cambodia's most feared Khmer Rouge cadres who stands trial before a newly
established hybrid tribunal and suggests the consequences of responding to war crime trials with
polemics rather than principle.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge troops seized control of Cambodia’s capital, 
Phnom Penh, marking the beginning of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days of an 
attempt to transform Cambodian society into an agrarian utopia. Pol pot and his 
senior leaders established a society based on agriculture and total collectivism. 
The Angkar or “Organization,” as the revolutionary movement named itself, was 
the sole governing power and the owner of all means of production and private 
property. Cambodia was renamed Democratic Kampuchea (DK).1 There was, 
however, nothing democratic about the regime or its methods.From 1975 to 1979, 
at least 1.7 million people were executed or died of overwork, starvation, torture 
or untreated disease because of the Khmer Rouge.2  
Today, thirty years later, Kaing Guek Eav, 66, better known by his nom de 
guerre, Duch, stands trial before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (“ECCC or the Tribunal”), an internationalized criminal tribunal co-
installed by the United Nations (“UN”) and the Cambodian government. Duch is 
the first defendant to be tried by the ECCC. Duch was the commandant of the S-
21 (“Tuol Sleng”) prison and detention center, which allegedly sent at least 
14,000 people to their deaths in unmarked graves. Four other senior Khmer Rouge 
leaders who were in a position to order the commission of mass atrocity are also 
in custody. They are Nuon Chea, 82, the movement’s chief ideologue; Khieu 
Samphan, 76, who was head of state; Ieng Sary, 82, the former foreign minister; 
and his wife, Ieng Thirith, 75, a fellow member of the Khmer Rouge central 
committee. Their trials are expected to commence later this year.  
The ECCC is not the first criminal tribunal that Cambodians have 
witnessed. In 1979, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, a government installed 
by the invading Vietnamese and consisting of Khmer Rouge cadres who had 
defected to the new Vietnamese installed administration,3 established a People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal (‘PRT’). The PRT charged Pol Pot and Ieng Sary for, 
inter alia, genocide. The trial took place at a time when the Khmer Rouge still 
controlled territory within Cambodia.  As such, neither Pol Pot nor Ieng Sary 
were present in court. A few handpicked foreign lawyers and journalists with 
Vietnamese-approved credentials were invited to attend. Notably, the defendants’ 
court-appointed defense counsel, Hope Stevens, offered little in the way of a 
                                                 
1 David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder, Colorado: West view Press, 1983), 209–11; 
Evan Gottesman, 
Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge. Inside the Politics of Nation Building (New Haven: Yale 
University, 2003), 24–25. 
2 See generally David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1991). 
3 Including current Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who aged twenty-seven in 1979, was the 
world’s youngest foreign minister at the time. 
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defense and instead implicated her clients: “I have not come half-way around the 
world to give approval to monstrous crime or to ask mercy for criminals. No! A 
thousand times no!”4 Although the PRT trial presented some legitimate evidence, 
such as testimony from S-21 survivors, and was an emotionally charged 
experience for many of the 500 survivors who packed the makeshift courtroom 
each day, the tone was akin to the Stalinist show trials of the 1930s. Peter 
Maguire notes that the short duration of the trial, the denial of due process rights 
to the defendants who were convicted of genocide and sentenced to death in 
absentia, and the absurd defence combined to create the impression of “primitive 
political justice.”5 Maguire adds that the “reaction in the West to the verdict of the 
[PRT] was conspicuous silence - two square inches in the back pages of the New 
York Times.”6  
Times have changed, and the ECCC, the latest tribunal to adjudge the 
Khmer Rouge, is now front-page news. A few years ago, international 
commentators could not pronounce Duch’s name.7 Today, the international press 
is abuzz with news about Duch’s ongoing trial, the ECCC’s first. Is this attention 
in and of itself indicative of the trial’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community? Not quite. Daily news coverage and the fact that Duch is actually in 
court are hardly touchstones of legitimacy. In Cambodia, “the test of legitimacy is 
not arrests – the Cambodian government knows how to arrest people it doesn't 
like – but whether fair trials can be carried out so that Cambodians can see that 
justice is possible in their country."8 I argue that the trial’s legitimacy should be 
measured in the context of, and by how it responds to, the unfairness of its first 
public pre-trial hearing concerning Duch that took place two years ago. 
Indeed, the Cambodian people first saw Duch standing at the dock at the 
ECCC’s public hearing in November 2007 (‘the November 2007 Hearing’). At 
that hearing, the scene of the hundreds or thousands of Cambodians assembled in 
the public gallery evoked a sense of déjà-vous. However, the crying that typified 
the PRT’s proceedings had vanished. When Duch’s Cambodian lawyer Kar 
Savuth suggested that Duch’s human rights had been violated because of his 8-
year pre-trial detention by the Cambodian government prior to the hearing, the 
largely Cambodian audience erupted into laughter. Cambodian human rights 
activist Kek Galabru observed that “[t]his is Cambodian style, they laugh…it’s 
too much for them because they know that when he was torturing Cambodians 
                                                
4 Howard De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth Robinson, eds., Genocide in Cambodia, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) 507-8. 
5 Peter Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, (Columbia University Press, 2005) 65. 
6 Ibid, 65. 
7 Pronounced ‘DOIK’, not “Doosh” or “Dutch” as I have heard said several times on foreign radio 
and television media over the past few years. 
8 Brad Adams, the Director of Human Rights Watch (Asia), interviewed by Erika Kinetz, 
Cambodia Justice moves forward, Christian Science Monitor, November 21 2007  
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there was no talk about the human rights of the victims. Even me, when I hear 
that, I laugh.”9 According to Galabru, the idea of conferring human rights to an 
alleged human rights violator is understandably laughable for local victims of the 
Khmer Rouge. 
Yet, some foreign affiliates of international criminal justice too were 
skeptical about what Kar Savuth had said in court. Ambassador David Scheffer, 
former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, who served as amicus curiae 
to the ECCC’s Pre-Trial Chamber at the November 2007 Hearing, said that 
violations committed by the Cambodian government against Duch were of no 
concern to the ECCC, a “separately constituted, independent and internationalized 
court.”10 
Vindicating this skepticism, the half-Cambodian, half-international ECCC 
chose to ignore the violation of Duch’s rights, and with it, both Cambodian and 
international law. The ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision underscores a primal 
truth about the international criminal justice affiliates: their universe is 
monochromatic, neatly split between good and evil. The victim is a powerless, 
righteous figure whose suffering must be expressed and heard by the vicious 
savage who is the victimizer. This is an essential distinction for public opinion. 
Otherwise, as Makau Mutua reminds us, it is difficult to mobilize local and 
international public outrage against and denounce the victimizer, or evoke 
sympathy for the victim.11 However, when a victimizer casts himself as a victim 
and upends the denunciation ceremony, affiliates are confused as to how it should 
respond. It resorts, as the ECCC did, to semantic distinctions and illogic to shore 
up the denunciation ceremony rather than face angry victims who have assembled 
or the fear that questioning the primacy of this ceremony undermines their own 
legitimacy. 
Hybrid tribunals such as the ECCC have been criticized for the normative 
and cultural dissonance that can arise between their local and international 
elements.12 I urge that we consider an ailment that afflicts both the local and 
                                                 
9 Seth Mydans, “Khmer Rouge Figure Appears in Open Court.” New York Times 21 November 
2007, electronic edition: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/asia/21cambo.html>  
10 David Scheffer, Amicus Curiae brief, In the Appeal of Duch against the CIJ’s Detention Order, 
October 4 2007, 3 (“As a separately constituted, independent and internationalized court, which 
did not exist during the period of Duch’s detention by the military court, the ECCC is not 
responsible for the detention of DUCH by the military court, nor can it be held responsible for any 
reference by the military court to the ECCC law”.) 
11 Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 201, 230 (2001). 
12 See e.g. James Cockayne, Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes trials as 
Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies 4 Journal of Human Rights, 1-19 (2005); Susan de 
Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST., 226-244 
(2003); Suzannah  Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International 
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international elements – a penchant for denunciation; for viewing 
humanitarianism in monochrome rather than seeing the shades that emerge within 
it. If the ECCC allows its ongoing trial to go the way of its first hearing, it will not 
only fall short of its transformative aspirations, but affirm the belief that this 
modern Khmer Rouge trial is no better that its predecessor, the PRT’s show-trial 
of 1979.13  
II. MIXED TRIBUNAL, MIXED FEELINGS 
The ECCC’s latest choices must be analyzed in the context of its political history. 
Cold War politics and the competing interests of several states impeded the 
establishment of an international tribunal throughout the 1980s.14 Painstaking 
negotiations among the UN, various member states, and Cambodia over much of 
the ensuing decade reflected “a mixture of—depending on the government in 
question—ambivalence, conflicting priorities, and/or active hostility to a 
tribunal.”15 The idea of a hybrid tribunal, a “national court with international 
characteristics,”16 was first considered for Cambodia.17 In June 1997, the then 
Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers requested “the assistance of the [UN] and the 
international community in bringing to justice those responsible for the genocide 
and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 
1979” which claimed almost a quarter of Cambodia’s population at the time, since 
                                                                                                                                    
Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F., 185-246 (2001); Suzannah Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities at the District 
Court of Dili, 2 MELB. J. INT’L L., 414-458. 
13 Linguist and trenchant critic Noam Chomsky has described Duch’s ongoing trial as a “farce” for 
a variety of reasons, including the selectivity of prosecution. See Marwaan Macan-Markarq Khmer 
Rouge Trials May Expose US, China, Inter Press Service, March 30, 2009.  
14 See generally David P. Chandler: Facing the Cambodian past: Selected essays, 1971-1994 
(Silkworm Books 1996). 
15 James A. Goldston, “An Extraordinary Experiment in Transitional Justice”, in Justice Initiatives 
(OSJI, Spring 2006), p.2 [hereinafter ‘Justice Initiatives’]; also see Thomas Hammarberg, “Efforts 
to Establish a Tribunal against Khmer Rouge Leaders: Discussion between the Cambodian 
Government and the UN,” paper presented on May 29, 2001, at a seminar in Stockholm organized 
by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia, reprinted as a special supplement to the Phnom Penh Post, September 14-27, 
2001. 
16 Presentation by Deputy Prime Minister Sok An to the National Assembly on Ratification of the 
Agreement Between Cambodia and the UN and Amendments to the 2001 Law concerning the 
Establishment of the ECCC, at 8 (4-5 Oct. 2004). 
17 For the process in Cambodia, see e.g., Steve. Heder et al., ‘Seven Candidates for Prosecution: 
Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge’, War Crimes Office of the Washington 
College of Law, American University and the Coalition for International Justice, June 2001; Helen 
Jarvis, ‘Trials and Tribulations: The Latest Twists in the Long Quest for Justice for the 
Cambodian Genocide’, Critical Asian Studies, pp. 607-610 (2002). 
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“Cambodia does not have the resources or expertise to conduct this very 
important procedure.”18 
The legitimacy, fairness and independence of the Khmer Rouge trials have 
been called into question from the very moment they were conceived. In 1999 a 
Group of Experts, appointed by the UN Secretary-General on the request of the 
General Assembly19 considered, inter alia, establishing a tribunal established 
under Cambodian law with Cambodian jurists serving as judges, or, alternatively, 
a Cambodian tribunal under UN administration. However, the Group itself 
advised against these “mixed options”, as it doubted the bona fides of Royal 
Cambodian Government led by strongman Hun Sen, who had by then ousted his 
Co-Prime minister in a bloody coup. The Group feared that “the negotiation of an 
agreement [between the UN and the Cambodian government] and the preparation 
of legislation for and its adoption by the Cambodian National Assembly could 
drag on. (…) The Cambodian government might insist on provisions that might 
undermine the independence of the court.”20 The Group also believed that the 
Cambodian judiciary lacked competence and independence and was unlikely to 
meet minimal international standards of justice, even with UN assistance. 
Ultimately, the Group of Experts recommended that an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal be established by the UN Security Council pursuant to its 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to "restore international peace and 
security."21  
The Group of Experts was remarkably prescient. While the Group’s 
recommendation was consistent with Hun Sen’s original request in 1997 for an 
international tribunal akin to the ICTY or ICTR,22 it no longer sat well with him 
the following year. Just less than a month after the Cambodian government 
welcomed the Group to discuss prospects for a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge, 
Hun Sen welcomed the defection of, and granted amnesties to, Khmer Rouge 
senior leaders Nuon Chea and Khieu Sampan. Hun Sen announced that Cambodia 
                                                 
18 Letter of 21 June 1997 (“Requesting Letter”) as partly reproduced in UN Docs. A/53/850 and 
S/1999/231, ‘Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 52/135 Annexed to Identical Letters dated 15 March 1999 from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security 
Council’, (the “Report of the Group of Experts”) para 5. 
19 UN Doc. GA/RES/52/135 (1997). 
20 Report of the Group of Experts, para 190. 
21 Ibid, para 190. 
22 The Requesting Letter (dated 21 June 1997) reads, inter alia, “Cambodia does not have the 
resources or expertise to conduct this very important procedure. Thus, we believe it is necessary to 
ask for the assistance of the United Nations. We are aware of similar efforts to respond to the 
genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and ask that similar 
assistance be given to Cambodia”. See Report of the Group of Experts, para 5. 
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should now “dig a hole and bury the past.”23 In 2001, the Prime Minister went as 
far as to say that if Ieng Sary, widely regarded as a principal architect of the 
Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, was “brought to trial, there will be war again in 
Cambodia. This is a warning.”24 
Subsequent negotiations were characterized by the UN seeking to 
guarantee international standards of justice by demanding greater primacy, with 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan observing that “if the international standards 
of justice, fairness and the process of law are to be met in holding those who have 
committed such serious crimes accountable, the tribunal in question must be 
international in character”25; and the Cambodian government insisting that the 
tribunal bear the legal imprimatur of the Cambodian legal system, with Hun Sen 
commenting that the Secretary General was insulting Cambodians. According to 
Hun Sen, the only job that the UN was willing to give them was the demeaning 
one of “go(ing) into the jungle to capture the tiger” and being “the watchdog for 
the UN.”26  
Amidst these tensions, the nascent tribunal was considered a lost cause by 
both national27 and international28 commentators – a politicized creature that 
would be strangled at birth and not hold the Khmer Rouge responsible for their 
heinous crimes. In February 2002, the UN withdrew from the negotiations 
because “as currently envisaged, the Cambodian court would not guarantee 
independence, impartiality and objectivity, which is required by the United 
Nations for it to cooperate with such a court.”29   
                                                
23 Seth Mydans, “Cambodian leader resists punishing top Khmer Rouge”, New York Times, 29 
December 1998. 
24 Asian Political News, “Trial of Khmer Rouge's Ieng Sary would mean war: Hun Sen”, January 
15, 2001. 
25 Preamble, Report of the Group of Experts. 
26 Sok An, The Cambodian Government, Justice Initiatives, 28. 
27 Kek Galabru, Executive Director of Cambodian human rights NGO LICADHO, was moved to 
say that "if the (Cambodian) government really had the political will to establish this tribunal we 
should have had one already...we are not sure that the tribunal will ever happen, even though the 
government has no more excuses to delay."  Anthony Dworkin, Cambodian War Crimes Tribunal 
Given Go-Ahead, May 5, 2005. Available at <http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-
cambodia2.html>. 
28 Peter Mcguire, “Cambodia Genocide: Memories from Tuol Sleng Prison”, 2002: (“The recent 
acquittal of the Khmer Rouge commander Chhouk Rin by a Cambodian judge, invoking a 
controversial Khmer Rouge amnesty law and the recent statements of members of the Cambodian 
Parliament, make it very unlikely that the parliament will approve the UN's trial plan. The 
uncertain fate of the UN-approved Khmer Rouge war-crimes tribunal raises a troubling question: 
Was amnesty for Khmer Rouge war crimes the price for peace in Cambodia”.) Available at < 
http://www.fathom.com/feature/35706/>. 
29 Seth Mydans, ‘U.N. Ends Cambodia Talks on Trials for Khmer Rouge’, New York Times, 9 
February 2002, p. 4. 
6
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 4 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 10
DOI: 10.2202/1932-0205.1186
Brought to you by | Singapore Management University
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/3/17 7:49 AM
  
Nonetheless, on the insistence of the UN General Assembly,30 
negotiations were resumed and a bilateral agreement ( the “UN Agreement”) was 
signed on 6 June 2003 setting out the “legal basis and the principles and 
modalities for …their cooperation” and establishing the tribunal as a Cambodian 
tribunal: an “Extraordinary Chambers within the existing court structure of 
Cambodia”, albeit “with international assistance.”31The Cambodian legislature 
officially recognized the ECCC on 27 October 2004 when the State implemented 
the UN Agreement through the adoption of enabling legislation (the “ECCC 
Law”).32 
At this stage, there seemed to be tenuous confluence between the UN and 
Cambodian sides. Despite his earlier reservations regarding the UN Agreement 
and the ECCC Law, the UN’s Chief negotiator, Under-Secretary Hans Corell, 
insisted that the ECCC’s foundational documents were “designed to ensure a fair 
and public trial by an independent and impartial court.”33 But with this shared 
sovereignty came, as top Cambodian negotiator Ambassador Ouch Borith noted, a 
“shared  responsibility” on the part of the international community and the 
Cambodian government for “judging the serious crimes committed in our own 
country by our own people,”34 not to mention the responsibility to shore up the 
legitimacy of the ECCC. 
 
III. A ‘NEW PHASE’ IN CAMBODIAN JUSTICE 
 
It has been suggested that Borith’s call for shared responsibility for and 
sovereignty of the trials was finally given effect at the November 2007 Hearing.35 
At this hearing, Duch appeared before the ECCC’s Pre-trial Chamber (“PTC”) to 
                                                 
30 UN Doc. GA/RES/57/228 (2002). 
31Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, Preamble 6 June 2003, available at   <http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/ 
index.htm>. 
32 Law on the Ratification of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea and Law on Amendments to the Law on 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 5 October 2004, available at 
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/index.htm 
33 Transcript, “Hans Corell interview,” BBC East Asia Today, March 17, 2003. 
34 Statement by His Excellency Ouch Borith ambassador, permanent representative of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia to the United Nations at the Third Committee of the 57th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, New York, May 1, 2003. 
35 The ECCC’s chief spokesperson, Peter Foster, described the hearing as a “milestone event in the 
history” of the ECCC and Cambodia. See Peter Foster’s interview by Reuters, “Khmer Rouge 
Jailer in court’s first public hearing”, November 20, 2007.  
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appeal his pre-trial detention ordered by the Co-Investigating Judges (“CIJ”).  As 
the commandant of the notorious detention center, Tuol Sleng, Duch is alleged to 
have directed countless crimes against the civilian population. On Duch’s 
command, at least 15,000 people were interred at Tuol Sleng, where they were 
chained to beds, tortured into making false confessions, and executed in a nearby 
field. Duch’s name is on many execution documents. At the conclusion of this 
hearing, the PTC unanimously upheld the CIJ’s detention order against Duch, 
rejecting his appeal and request for provisional release pending his trial. Both the 
ECCC’s pre-trial courts - the CIJ and the PTC - agreed that Duch’s continued pre-
trial detention was warranted under Rule 63(3) of the ECCC’s rules of procedure 
(‘Internal Rules’). In other words, they believed that Duch had committed the 
crimes alleged and that provisional detention was a necessary measure to ensure 
his presence in court; prevent him from exerting pressure on victims; protect his 
security; and preserve public order.36  
Duch’s continued detention was hailed as ushering in a “new phase” in 
Cambodian justice that could give Cambodian victims some “measure of comfort 
and assuage fears that they would die before they saw justice.”37 To one victim, 
Ker Math of Kampong Chhnang province, the ECCC’s rejection of Duch’s appeal 
against detention affirmed his belief that the ECCC could bring justice to 
Cambodia:  “If the court released Duch I would have lost faith. I would not have 
followed the Tribunal any more. I can believe in it now.”38  
Youk Chhang, Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-
CAM), proclaimed that Duch’s detention was a “victory” for “ordinary 
Cambodians:”39 
“The arrests and detention of [Duch and other Khmer Rouge] will at last 
give ordinary Cambodians a victory. [They], who have changed little and 
still fail to understand the pain their victims endured, will finally be called 
into account and perhaps soon see justice done in a court of law. The 
arrests of the most politically untouchable of the Khmer Rouge leaders is a 
powerful message to the people of Cambodia and gives us hope that our 
country will move toward a better future.” 
                                                
36 Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Appeal against Provisional Detention Order, 2 December 2007 
(hereafter “PTC Decision”) paras 27-61. 
37 Erika Kinetz, “Cambodian Justice Moves Forward, Phnom Penh Post, 21 November 2007. 
38 Thea Clay, “Duch Pre-trial hearing - 41 Community and Religious Leaders Continue their 
Participation in the ECCC  Under the Living Documents Project”, available at 
<www.cambodiatribunalmonitor.org  
39 Youk Chhang, Khmer Justice, Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2007  
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Ker Math and Youk Chhang’s faith in the ECCC appear to reinforce what Diane 
Aman terms the “message” of international criminal justice40 – i.e. the belief that 
the ECCC’s proceedings and punishment “affirm the value of law, strengthen 
social solidarity and incubate a moral consensus among the public.”41 Proponents 
of hybrid tribunals have argued that these tribunals can effectively serve such 
expressivist goals.42 While the hybrid model was originally adopted for practical 
reasons – hybrid tribunals are ostensibly cheaper to operate that the ad hoc 
tribunals43 – Laura Dickinson posits that hybrid tribunals “hold a good deal of 
promise and actually offer an approach that may address some of the concerns 
about purely international justice, on the one hand, and purely local justice, on the 
other.”44  Hybrid tribunals, it has been argued, combine the best of both worlds, 
the purely national and the purely international prosecution of universally 
condemned crimes, and transcend the shortcomings of each world viewed 
separately.45 
In particular, hybrid tribunals are said to be politically less divisive, more 
meaningful to victim populations, and more effective at rebuilding local judicial 
systems than purely international trials.46 Trials by the ICTY and the ICTR are 
considered to lack legitimacy because those who have been most directly affected 
by the crimes lack ownership of the trials. The prosecution takes place in far away 
countries, in which the key actors are lawyers, not familiar with the conflict and 
culture in which the crimes have been committed. Consequently, it has been 
argued that many of the positive messaging effects that trials can have on the 
                                                 
40 Diane Marie Aman, Message as Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.l., 237, 
238 (2001) (“Expressive theories look not so much at whether a law deters or whether a law 
punishes, but at the message we get from a law”.) 
41 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 17 (Cambridge: 2007). 
42For authors advocating the promise of hybrid courts see Laura Dickinson, ‘Transitional Justice 
in Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals’, Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, 23-42 (2002) ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’, 2003 American Journal of International 
Law Journal, pp. 295-310, ‘The Relationship between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: the 
Case of Kosovo’, New England Law Review (2003); Etelle Higonnet, ‘Restructuring Hybrid 
Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform’, Yale Law School Student 
Scholarship Series, Paper 6 (2005); and Rosanna Lipscomb, ‘Restructuring the ICC Framework to 
Advance Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan’, Columbia Law 
Review, 182-212 (2006). 
43  Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal / Vol. 16, Spring 2003, 246. 
44 L. Dickinson, ‘The Relationship between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of 
Kosovo’, New England Law Review, 1059-1072, 1060 (2003). 
45 Sarah Nouwen, ‘Hybrid courts’: The hybrid category of a new type of international crimes 
courts’, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December) 2006, 190-214, p.191. 
46 Laura Dickinson ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’, 2003 American Journal of International Law, 
pp. 295-310, p. 296. 
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society concerned do not reach the affected society.47 For these reasons, these 
one-time favorite children of the international community, sired by the UN 
Security Council or by multi-lateral treaty, have been accused of undermining, 
“the preservation of collective memory, the national rule of law, [and…] the 
realization of justice.”48 
The ECCC, on the other hand, is in Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister 
Sok Ann’s words, a “mixed or hybrid tribunal- firmly located in the national 
courts but involving both national and international law; national and 
international judges, prosecutors, staff; and national and international 
financing.”49 James Cockayne suggests that the ECCC may therefore be able to 
ensure that local communities identify with the process,50 not only because it will 
operate in a context comparably removed in time from the conflict and the 
destruction over which it must sit in judgment, but because it is designed to give a 
prominent role to local actors.51 
With respect to the penetration of international norms, purely international 
courts have been criticised for not tailoring their approach or process to domestic 
circumstances or desires and thereby isolating the locally affected community 
resulting in justice done at the international level not being perceived as justice 
seen to be done by the local community.52 Although domestic courts (arguably) 
understand local legal culture, they may not be the best fit. As one scholar notes, 
“in cases of international crimes, national courts are not the appropriate fora to 
judge the perpetrators” as they are unable or unwilling to prosecute complex 
international crimes or apply international standards of justice”53. Indeed, 
Cambodia’s notoriously weak judiciary apparently prompted the Cambodian 
                                                
47 Mark A. Drumbl, Towards a New Criminology of International Crime19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 263, 271. 
48 Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda Yale Journal of 
International Law 24 (1999): 385. 
49 Sok An, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: What it Means for Cambodia, Justice Initiative, p.28. 
50 James Cockayne, Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes trials as Unsuccessful 
Degradation Ceremonies Journal of Human Rights, 4:455, 2005 at p.459. 
51. Every investigative, prosecutorial and administrative department within the ECCC is headed or 
co-headed by a Cambodian national. All defendants and victim civil parties are required to have a 
national lawyer who may be assisted by a foreign co-lawyer. The ECCC’s judicial chambers are 
staffed by more Cambodians than internationals. Diane Orentlicher, special counsel of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, believes that the Tribunal marks the evolution of international justice, 
“recognition, after 15 years of international and hybrid courts like this one, not to exclude victims 
from the justice that is being dispensed on their behalf”, telephone interview with Seth Mydans, 
“In the Khmer Rouge Trials, Victims will not Stand Idly By” New York Times, June 17 2008. 
52 Seth Mydans, “In the Khmer Rouge Trials, Victims will not Stand Idle By” New York Times, 
June 17 2008. 
53 A. Pellet, ‘Internationalized Courts: Better than Nothing in: C. Romano et al. (eds.), 
Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 2004, pp. 437-444, p. 439. 
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government to request an internationalized court in the first place. As Sok An has 
said:54 
“[Although] we were fully entitled to prosecute the Khmer Rouge in a 
national court, we sought international involvement in the process, 
preferably through the United Nations. Why... because we were all too 
acutely aware of the weaknesses of our judiciary, and wanted help to make 
certain that the trial will meet internationally accepted standards.” 
 
Applying Dickinson’s vision to the ECCC, its mixed judicial composition is 
designed to provide opportunities “for the cross-fertilization of international and 
domestic norms regarding accountability for mass atrocity”, and perhaps even 
“create a network of international and domestic legal professionals, providing a 
setting in which they can interact, share experiences, and discuss the relevant 
norms, both in and out of the courtroom.”55 Dickinson’s vision pays tribute to 
Oscar Shacter’s famous reference to the emergence of an “invisible college of 
international lawyers” 56. Borrowing Shacter’s metaphor, the ECCC can be said to 
function as a college of international(ized) lawyers and judges, the “humanitarian 
and welfarist legalism of which appears to cut across political divisions.”57  
Such is the globalitarian rhetoric of hybrid tribunals. This rhetoric is not 
confined to law journals, but finds its way into the tribunals’ foundational 
documents. Even though the ECCC was established, as I said earlier, after 
considerable political hectoring and compromise by the UN and the Cambodian 
government, accountability for Khmer Rouge senior leaders and those most 
responsible for crimes was embraced by all as an overarching value. It just felt 
right. Employing language reflected in the statutes of the other hybrid tribunals,58 
the UN General Assembly also extolled other norms and values that it claimed 
flow from accountability, as it adopted the UN Agreement establishing the 
ECCC: 
 
                                                 
54 Sok An, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: What it Means for Cambodia, Justice Initiative, p.28. 
55 Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Justice, 307. 
56Oscar Schachter, a member of the UN legal staff and later Professor at the University of 
Columbia referred to the emergence of an “invisible college of international lawyers” dedicated to 
the development of universally recognized legal norms in his seminal article, ‘The Invisible 
College of International Lawyers,’ 72 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. (1977), 217. 
57 Martti Koskenniemi, International Lawyers (2007), p.3, paper presented at Erik Castrén 
Institute of International Law and Human Rights, available at  
<http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Talks_Papers_MK.htm>  
58 For example, in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the hope of the UN Security 
council was that a “credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes 
committed there would end impunity and would contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace..”.UN Security Council Resolution 
1315 (2000), Preambular Paragraph 6 (August 14, 2000). 
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“accountability of individual perpetrators of grave human rights violations 
is one of the central elements of any effective remedy for victims of 
human rights violations and a key factor in ensuring a fair and equitable 
justice system and, ultimately, reconciliation and stability.”59  
These values are laudable, but one value does not necessarily flow from the 
other.60 Tensions can, as we shall see, arise between “accountability” and 
“ensuring a fair and equitable justice” when the “individual perpetrator of grave 
human rights violations” is himself a victim. 
IV. SCHISM IN HUMANITARIANISM 
An analysis of the November 2007 Hearing suggests that the ECCC has not 
delivered on Sok An’s promise of adhering to “internationally accepted 
standards” or Dickinson’s promise of a “cross-fertilization of [legal] norms.” At 
this hearing, Duch appealed against his provisional detention by the CIJ because 
he had been previously detained “without trial for 8 years, 6 months and 10 
days."61 More precisely, the Military Court of Phnom Penh had detained Duch 
since 10 May 1999 until he was brought before the ECCC on 30 July 2007 (the 
“Prior Detention”), without trial or any other form of judicial recourse.  Duch’s 
Prior Detention raised a critical issue for the ECCC’s consideration – should a 
breach of Duch’s rights be redressed, even if the appropriate legal remedy was 
release, or should a lesser standard of humanitarianism be applied to Duch 
because of the gravity of his alleged crimes? Put simply, should the ECCC, 
existing within Cambodia’s court structure,62 treat an extraordinary allegation of 
crime as a local court would an ordinary one? 
Cambodian law does not make a distinction between alleged genocidaires
and garden-variety criminals. As a State Party to the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the Cambodian government, is obliged to 
“respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the …Covenant,”63 including the right to be 
tried within a “reasonable time” or “without undue delay” under, inter alia, 
                                                
59 Preamble, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly – the Khmer Rouge Trials, GA 
Resolution A/RES/57/228, 27, February 2003 [the UN GA Resolution adopting the UN 
Agreement which created the ECCC]. 
60 The claim that accountability leads to effective remedy for victims, reconciliation and stability 
is also disputed by scholars and, in view of the paucity of empirical evidence, remains to be seen 
in the Cambodian context. For the purposes of this article, I will interrogate the claim that 
accountability ensures fair and equitable justice. 
61 Kevin Doyle, Long Delayed Justice, TIME, November 21, 2007. 
62 Preamble Framework UN agreement, ECCC law, Art 2 
63 Article 2(1), ICCPR. 
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Articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c). Further, through Cambodia’s ratification of major 
universal human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, Cambodian law has 
received and incorporated international human rights norms into its corpus of 
fundamental liberties and offers excellent constitutional arrangements for the 
application of these norms, regardless of the practical problems associated with 
their effective enforcement.64 In particular, the Constitution states that the 
government “shall recognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the... 
covenants and conventions related to human rights.”65 
It follows that where a branch of the Cambodian government fails to fulfil 
its obligations under the ICCPR, the ECCC, applying Cambodian criminal 
procedure as it is required to, must remedy such unlawful conduct.66 This is 
especially so where the government’s conduct impinges on a defendant’s due 
process rights. In such cases, the ECCC is expressly required to exercise its 
jurisdiction in accordance with “international standards of justice, fairness and 
due process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR.”67 
From the perspective of both Cambodian and international law, therefore, 
the ECCC had a duty to inquire into and pronounce upon the legality of Duch’s 
Prior Detention. There is no golden rule for ascertaining if a particular period 
amounts to a violation of Articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR. Decisions of 
the Human Rights Committee or European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) do 
not adopt a mechanical approach to pre-trial detention or set out an arbitrary or 
fixed limit that can be applied to all cases where there has been a delay. Rather, 
each considers the facts of the case on their individual merits. In fact, the ECHR 
has eschewed fixed limits and approached cases concerning detention on remand 
by considering a range of factors in the circumstances of the particular case.68 
Similarly, the fact that the Human Rights Committee has found a certain period of 
detention to be unreasonable in once case does not mean that detention for a 
similar period in another would ipso facto be considered unreasonable – 
complexities can justify delays.69 
                                                 
64 Alexander Zahar & Goran Sluiter, International Criminal Law (Oxford) 2007. p. 280. 
65 See Translation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, Article 13, available online at 
http://www.cdpcambodia.org/constitution.asp 
66 Article 12(1), UN Agreement (“The procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law.)  
67 Article 12(2), UN Agreement. 
68 See the "Document Containing the Charges pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) and of the List of 
Evidence pursuant to Rule 121(3)" (1CC-01/04-01/06-356 and annexes, 28 August 2006." Such 
factors include, inter alia, the complexity of the case, the severity of the offence and the penalty to 
be expected in the case of a conviction, the range of evidence and difficulties in the investigation, 
and the conduct of the judicial authorities”. 
69 Communication No.336/1988, at p.306, para. 6.6 
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Nonetheless, the Committee has determined that delays (from arrest to 
trial) in other cases of 29 months70 and 2 years,71 periods which are significantly 
less than Duch’s Prior Detention of more than 8 years, were violations of Articles 
9(3) and/or 14(3) of the ICCPR.  For Duch’s Prior Detention to be lawful under 
the ICCPR, it must have occurred “on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.”72 Any further detention extending the 
legally specified period “should be deemed prima facie unlawful” as “any norm 
that authorizes the release of a prisoner from jail cannot be interpreted so as to 
allow the preventative detention to be prolonged for a greater length of time than 
the procedural code deems reasonable for the entire judicial procedure.”73 Any 
extension of a period of detention must be “strictly scrutinized” to ensure that is it 
not unlawful.74 
What then does Cambodia’s criminal procedure deem an unreasonable 
period of detention? Under Cambodian criminal procedure – either the rules 
which currently apply (Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure, 2007) or those 
which applied when Duch was under the custody of the Military Court and 
pursuant to which he was detained (Law on Temporary Detention Period, 1999) – 
a defendant must be brought before a court and judged no later than 6 months 
after his arrest and can only be held in temporary pre-trial detention for a period 
of 1 year, which may be extended twice, but cannot exceed 3 years in total.75 
Duch’s continuous prior detention of more than 8 years without any 
demonstrable attempt to bring him to trial flouts Cambodian criminal procedure 
and is  prima facie unlawful, violating his fundamental right to a trial within a 
reasonable time or to release. Having acknowledged that the prior detention was 
“problematic in light of international standards of justice”, the ECCC’s pre-trial 
courts should have proceeded to examine, determine and declare the illegality of 
this detention under both Cambodian and international law. Consistent with 
international jurisprudence, the ECCC’s pre-trial courts should have granted 
                                                
70 Communication No.564/1993, J. Leslie v Jamaica (Views adopted on 31 July 1998), in UN 
Doc. GAOR, A/53/40 vol. 11.), p.28, para 9.3. 
71 Communication No. 672/1995, C. Smart v Trinidad and Tobago (Views adopted on 29 July 
1998), in UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol.11), p.149, para 10.2. 
72 ICCPR, supra note 31, art, 9(1); Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica, HRC Comm. No. 702/1966, 
Para. 5.5 (1997) (“the principle of legality is violated if an individual is arrested or detained on 
grounds which are not clearly established in domestic legislation”); Hugo van Alphen v. 
Netherlands, HRC Comm. No. 305/1988, Para. 5.6 (1990) (providing that States must “observe 
the rules governing pre-trial detention laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure”). 
73 Jorge A. Gimenez v Argentina, Case 11,245, Report 12/96, Inter-Am. CHR., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 
Doc.7 at 33, para 71 (1996). 
74 Ibid, para 72. 
75 Law on Temporary Detention Period, CS/RKM/0899/09, Art. 1 (adopted 26 August1999), 
Transitional Criminal Law, Ar.21(1) (adopted 10 September 1992), Cambodian Criminal 
Procedure Code, Article L.413-26, Internal Rules, Art.63(6),(7) adopted 10 August 2007) 
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declaratory relief allocating responsibility for human rights violations to the 
Cambodian government and  terminate proceedings in view of the egregious 
abuse of the court’s process. Alternatively, if the courts had come to the 
conclusion that Duch’s rights “have been violated, but not egregiously so”, they 
could have insisted that the ECCC’s Trial Chamber reduce the sentence imposed, 
in the event of a conviction76 or award Duch financial compensation for the 
violation, in the event of an acquittal.77 
Remarkably, the ECCC’s pre-trial courts elected to forfeit their right to 
pronounce on the legality of Duch’s prior detention. Despite conceding that 
Duch’s prior detention was “problematic in light of international standards of 
justice and [Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR], which state that any individual 
…detained for a criminal offence shall be entitled to a trial within a reasonable 
time period or to be released,” 78 the ECCC’s pre-trial courts ruled that they did 
“not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of Duch’s prior detention” by 
another court.79 The courts justified their decisions on the ground that the alleged 
violation was occasioned by an external judicial authority, the Military Court, and 
was therefore outside the ECCC’s jurisdiction and of no concern to it.80 They 
added that the ECCC, like the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was as an 
“expression of the will of the international community” and as a special 
internationalised tribunal that was “part of the machinery of international justice”, 
was independent of the Cambodian government.81  
These arguments are, with respect, facile for several reasons. First, there is 
a crucial distinction between the ECCC and the SCSL with respect to their legal 
character. The SCSL is “treaty based organ…not anchored in any existing system 
                                                 
76 Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Juvenal Kajelijeli v Prosecutor, Judgement and Sentence, 1 
December 2003, at para. 967.  At trial, the defendant was granted credit for time served for five 
years, five months and twenty-five days. On Appeal, the time during which the defendant had 
spent awaiting his transfer from Benin to the ICTR in Arusha was added to this original credit, 
hence reducing the defendant’s sentence by an additional 306 days.  The Appeals Chamber also 
considered that the Trial Chamber had erred in its interlocutory decision dismissing the fact that 
his rights were violated during the period of his arrest and detention in Benin, and found in favour 
of the accused on appeal, ruling that the Trial Chamber should have determined his rights had 
been violated.   
77 Prosecutor v Andre Rwamakuba, Case no. ICTR-98-44C-T, Decision on Appropriate Remedy, 
paragraphs 40, 45 (31 January 2007). 
78 Order of Provisional Detention by the CIJ dated 31  July 2007 (“ CIJ’s Detention Order”) 
79 CIJ’s Detention Order, paragraphs 2 and 20. 
80 PTC Decision, para 19: “The Pre-trial Chamber is of the view that it can only take a violation of 
[Article 9 of the ICCPR] into account when the organ responsible for the violation was connected 
to the organ of the ECCC, or had been acting on behalf of the ECCC or in concert with organs of 
the ECCC…For all practical and legal purposes, the ECCC is, and operates as, an independent 
entity within the Cambodian court structure and therefore has no jurisdiction to judge the activities 
of other bodies”.  
81 Ibid, p.8. 
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(i.e. the UN Administrative law or the national law of the State of the seat).”82
The ECCC, on the other hand, is not a new international institution - “no new 
participant in the international legal order has been created.”83 As a court that is 
part of Cambodia’s judicial system,84 the ECCC is obliged to respect Cambodia’s 
laws, procedures and constitutional arrangements for the application of human 
rights by its courts, including those rights conferred by the ICCPR.85 The ECCC’s 
pre-trial courts thus erred by failing to exert their inherent authority to rule on the 
unlawfulness of Duch’s prior detention and consider an appropriate remedy.  
Second, the courts’ assumption that the ECCC had no part in Duch’s prior 
detention is false. Of course, the ECCC had not been established when the 
Military Court first arrested and detained Duch on 10 May 1999. The ECCC was 
established by the UN Agreement dated 6 June 2003 and implemented by the 
ECCC Law, which entered into force on 27 October 2004. At the earliest, the 
ECCC came into formal existence and began operating on 3 July 2006, when the 
judges were sworn in, and, at the very latest, it did so on 12 June 2007, when the 
Internal Rules, upon which the ECCC’s investigations and prosecutions are based, 
were adopted in the plenary meeting of judges. The ECCC obtained custody of 
Duch when the Military Court transferred him to its detention centre on 30 July 
2007. 
Yet, it is striking that Duch was detained by Military Court since 2002 
until 2007 in anticipation of the ECCC’s authority and jurisdiction detained 
Duch.86 The charges under which the Military Court detained Duch in February 
2002 were based on the ECCC Law (which had been formalised by then), the 
crimes over which the ECCC has jurisdiction, and on the basis of the same or 
similar allegations to those that form the subject matter of Duch’s indictment by 
                                                
82 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN 
Doc. S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, para. 9. 
83 Zahar & Sluiter, International Criminal Law, p.13 
84 ECCC Law, Article 2 (“Extraordinary Chambers shall be established in the existing court 
structure”). 
85 Agreement, Art. 12(1), "The procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law. Where 
Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the 
interpretation or application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or where there is a question 
regarding the consistency of such a rule with international standards, guidance may also be sought 
in procedural rules established at the international level." It is evident from this provision that the 
drafters of the UN Agreement sought to preclude the ECCC from relying on Cambodian law to 
circumvent international standards. See also, Goran Sluiter, Due Process and Criminal Procedure 
in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 314, 318-22 (2006) 
86 The charges against Duch and the orders placing him and holding him in detention by the 
Military Court were based on the crimes currently under the ECCC’s jurisdiction and the Military 
Court made specific reference to the ECCC’s authority to justify his Prior Detention. It appears 
therefore that Duch was merely being housed by the Military Court’s detention centre in 
anticipation of the ECCC’s proceedings against him. 
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the ECCC.87 In short, the Military Court’s detention order was expressly premised 
on the ECCC’s subject matter and temporal jurisdiction. The Military Court made 
little show of hiding this fact. As late as 28 February 2006, the Military Court’s 
detention order against Duch re-affirmed the original detention order, stating that 
he was being detained for “war crimes [and] crimes against internationally 
protected persons, according to Article 6 and Article 8 of the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes; committed in: Cambodia during the period from 17 April 
1975 to 6 January 1979.”88 
The ECCC, as an organ of the Cambodian government, had a legal 
obligation to review and remedy the breach of the government’s obligation under 
Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR to try Duch within a reasonable time or to release 
him. It was a patently poor excuse for the ECCC’s pre-trial courts to retort that 
Duch’s quarrel should have been with the Military Court and not the ECCC. Even 
if the ECCC was not to blame for Duch’s Prior Detention, as a court firmly 
located within the Cambodian court structure, the ECCC’s pre-trial courts were 
obliged to pronounce on the unlawfulness of Duch’s prior detention ordered and 
executed by another court and organ of the Cambodian government. 
Third, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the ECCC is akin 
to an international court, this does not detract from the ECCC’s obligation to look 
beyond its seat and examine alleged human rights violations committed by 
Cambodian national authorities against its defendants. The independence that 
international(ized) courts are clothed with is an independence from State 
interference, not a prerogative to dismiss human rights violations perpetrated by 
the State. In any event, the ECCC’s self-proclaimed status as a “special 
internationalized tribunal”89 strengthens its obligation to uphold the 
internationally recognized due process rights enshrined in Articles 9 and 14 of the 
ICCPR by ruling on the unlawfulness of Duch’s prior detention and ordering his 
immediate release. 
After all, as the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber has held, where national 
authorities hold a defendant in custody effectively on behalf of an international 
court, “a shared burden exists with regard to safeguarding the suspect’s 
fundamental rights in international cooperation on criminal matters.”90 That is 
because the tribunal has “overlapping responsibilities” with the national 
authorities and once it begins operation, it must ensure that “the case proceeds to 
trial in a way that respects the rights of the accused”. As a result, “if an accused is 
                                                 
87 Defense Appeal Brief Challenging the Order of Provisional Detention of 31 July 2007, Case.,. 
No. 002/14-08-2006, para 3, 5 September 2007. 
88 Military Court Detention Order, 28 February 2006, on file with author. 
89 PTC Chamber Decision, para 19. 
90 Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, para. 221. 
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arrested or detained by a State at the request or under the authority of the Tribunal 
even though the accused is not yet within the actual custody of the Tribunal, the 
Tribunal has a responsibility to provide whatever relief is available to it to attempt 
to reduce any violations as much as possible.”91 More recently, the ICC’s Appeals 
Chamber, in a case concerning its first defendant, held that it was required to “see 
that the process envisioned in [national] law was duly followed and that the rights 
of the arrestee were properly respected.”92  
The ECCC, however, refused to address and remedy the inordinate 
detention of its first defendant, abdicating its duty under its foundational 
documents to preserve international standards of justice, fairness and due process.  
Professors Zahar and Sluiter posit that this duty to ensure a fair trial and preserve 
the integrity of the judicial process, which is also found in the statutes of the other 
tribunals, empowers them to pronounce on violations of defendants’ rights and 
determine an appropriate remedy, even where national entities bear primary 
responsibility for these violations.  The relevant passage of their text merits being 
quoted in full: 93 
“When other entities bear primary responsibility for violations of human 
rights, what matters is the duty of every tribunal bench to protect the 
fairness and integrity of the trial by determining an appropriate remedy. 
Obviously, the trial does not start at the seat of the tribunal but extends to 
every act connected with it.  
While this may be a heavy and seemingly unfair burden on the tribunals – 
they interact with a wide variety of actors, not all of whom may apply the 
highest standards of justice, and the tribunals are not in a position to 
change this – the reverse is even more unfair. The decision [by tribunals] 
not to review national activities is simply untenable from the perspective 
of the duty to ensure a fair trial.”  
V. CROSS-NEGATION OF NORMS 
One would think that the international judges at the ECCC’s pre-trial courts, 
moved by their duty to ensure a fair trial, would have sought to give effect to 
international legal norms relating to due process and allow them to co-mingle 
with similar protections under Cambodian law. Conversely, one may have 
expected national judges, who may have adjudged the legality of government 
activities that impinge on due process rights as provincial judges, to have done the 
same by applying Cambodian law and criminal procedure. Yet, there was no sign 
                                                
91 Ibid, para. 223. 
92 Prosecutor. v. Lubanga, ICC Appeal Chamber, Case ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 Dec.06, para 41. 
93 Alezander Zahar & Goran Sluitter, “International Criminal Law”, (Oxford, 2008), at 285-6. 
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of Dickinson’s ‘cross-fertilization of international and domestic legal norms’ at 
the hearing, only a unanimous call for Duch’s continued detention, lest he be 
released and escape the deontological denunciation that lay in store for him.  
The pre-trial courts’ decisions suggest that when dealing with a 
genocidaire, fairness is an after-thought. The primary imperative seemed to be 
retribution. Retribution posits that mass atrocity calls out for punishment because, 
deontologically, it constitutes "radical evil" that must be categorically punished.94 
Put simply, genocidaires should be punished because it just feels right, regardless 
of the messiness that it may engender or leave behind.95  
Reluctant to be accused of mollycoddling a genocidaire, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber turned the November 2007 Hearing into a dramaturgical spectacle for 
victims, saying that “the Cambodian people have been waiting thirty years for 
justice, to see an end to impunity and to see in evidence what happened during 
this tragic period of their history”96. Apart from appeasing victims, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber also sought to congratulate itself. Noting the turnout of locals and 
internationals at its November 2007 Hearing, the Chamber observed:97 
  
“The first public hearing of the ECCC…has generated a great deal of 
interest amongst the Cambodian population and press, as well as the 
international community. Hundreds of people, including members of the 
public, the press, non-governmental organizations and the international 
community, came to attend this hearing. This interest is demonstrative of 
the fact that the trials…are still a matter of great concern today for the 
Cambodian population and the international community.” 
 
It can be said that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, which acquiesced to a 
violation of Duch’s human rights but celebrated his impending trial, smacks of 
mob justice. The college of international and local judges seemed to capitulate to 
victims’ desires. Many victims found, as I have explained, Duch’s plea that his 
rights had been violated laughable after he had extinguished theirs. Saying that 
Duch’s plea made a mockery of the dead and the handful of persons such as 
himself who narrowly survived death, Van Naath asked:98 
                                                 
94 Mark A. Drumbl, Towards a New Criminology of International Crime19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 263, 270.; See also Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 241 (1958); see also Carlos 
Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial vii, ix (1996). 
95 Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 561 
(2002), 561 (“stripped of its utility and rationality…international criminal justice is a criminal 
justice comes close to a religious exercise of hope and perhaps of deception.”) 
96 PTC Decision, para 53. 
97 PTC Decision, para 52. 
98Kevin Doyle’s interview with Van Naath, printed in, Long Delayed Justice, TIME, November 
21, 2007. 
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“Where were the human rights groups and lawyers to help me at that 
[Khmer Rouge] time? The court should remember that Duch killed people 
without consideration — whether they were elderly or children. What he 
did every day during that time was slaughter".  
Yet, the mob that calls for deontological denunciation is not constituted solely by 
locally afflicted victims. It also includes members of the international community 
of justice affiliates, such as David Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 
War Crimes, who welcomed the pre-trial courts’ decisions99. Leila Sadat explains 
that these affiliates consider international criminal law a regulatory tool through 
which they can construct a “normative discourse” that expresses “deep 
condemnation” of genocide and “support its victims:”100 
“[T]here is no doubt that by employing the criminal law – the most 
coercive form of power generally available to society to regulate social 
behavior – the international community (and its component states) is 
constructing a normative discourse that expresses deep condemnation of 
the behavior as well as support for its victims. As once scholar recently 
argued, the “documentary record clearly shows that the motivations of 
the trials at Leipzig, Constantinople, Nuremburg, Tokyo, The Hague and 
Arusha were not merely to purge. Victorious liberals saw their foes as 
war criminals deserving of just punishment.” 
The trouble with this “normative discourse” is that is assumes that “deep 
condemnation” in the name of “regulation” precipitates “just punishment”. The 
discourse is turned on its head when the genocidaire whom we seek to condemn 
is a victim in his own right and should justly be released. When this is the case, 
affiliates of international criminal justice hasten to justify why condemnation 
should prevail based on polemics, tenuous legal arguments and by pointing at 
victims as evidentiary support, even if the aggregate effect is to implicate the 
defendant’s guilt even before his trial, and thereby prematurely subvert its very 
legitimacy. 
Duch is not the first genocidaire to face a situation where local elements 
and international justice affiliates conspire to trade principle for polemics. Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza, leader of the Rwandan radio station Radio Télévision Libre 
                                                
99 David Scheffer, Amicus Curiae brief, In the Appeal of Duch against the CIJ’s Detention Order, 
October 4 2007. 
100 Leila Nadya Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction, National Amnesties, and Truth Commissions: 
Reconciling the Irreconcilable in Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of 
Serious Crimes Under International Law (Ed. Stephen Macedo), 2004, University of Pennsylvania 
Press. p.196 
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des Mille Collines during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, found himself in a similar 
predicament. In November 1999, the ICTR Appeals Chamber issued a decision to 
release Barayagwiza following his motion challenging the legality of his arrest 
and detention. The Appeals Chamber dismissed the indictment with prejudice and 
ordered Barayagwiza returned to Cameroon, where he had been arrested. The 
decision was based on violations of Barayagwiza's rights because of his 2-year 
detention without charge or appearance before the Tribunal.101 The Chamber held 
that the tribunal should remedy such violations, even if they cannot be entirely 
attributed to it.102  
Yet, after a request by the Prosecutor, a differently constituted Appeals 
Chamber reviewed the initial decision and, based on controversial evidence that 
only a 2-month delay was attributable to the Prosecutor, reversed this decision on 
March 31, 2000. The Appeals Chamber revoked Barayagwiza's release.103 The 
ICTR Appeals Chamber’s March 2000 decision has been widely criticized by for 
sacrificing principle on the altar of prosecution. Scholars suggest that the ICTR 
“distorted law in order to breathe new life into legal proceedings which had been 
terminated, by its first decision, for no reason other than to appease the Rwandese 
government which was furious about the release of a prominent defendant over 
what the government saw as a trivial human rights violation”.104 I would add that 
the ICTR also appeased the normative discourse of retribution and deontological 
denunciation constructed by affiliates of international criminal justice.  
Dragan Nikolic is another alleged war criminal whose rights were brushed 
aside, this time by the ICTY. Nikolic was the first person to be indicted by the 
ICTY in relation to war crimes that were committed during his tenure as 
commander of the Susica camp, a Bosnian Serb detention centre in the Vlasenica 
region of eastern Bosnia. Nikolic argued that he had been abducted by unknown 
individuals and put in the hands of the relevant authorities, contrary to the 
                                                 
101 The periods included the ten months covering his arrest in Cameroon and the extradition 
procedure; the nine-month delay in the request for Barayagwiza's provisional detention through 
his transfer to the detention center in Arusha; and the three months between his arrival at the 
detention unit in Arusha and his initial appearance before the Tribunal. 
102 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision, 3 
November 1999 (“Barayagwiza I’’), para 85: (“…the fact remains that the Appellant spent an 
inordinate amount of time in provisional detention without knowledge of the general nature of the 
charges against him. At this juncture, it is irrelevant that only a small portion of that total period of 
provisional detention is attributable to the Tribunal, since it is the Tribunal—and not any other 
entity—that is currently adjudicating the Appellant’s claims. Regardless of which other parties 
may be responsible, the inescapable conclusion is that the Appellant’s right to be promptly 
informed of the charges against him was violated”). 
103 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-A, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for 
Review or Reconsideration), 31 March 2000 
104 Alezander Zahar & Goran Sluitter, “International Criminal Law”, (Oxford, 2008), at vii-
viii.Also See William Schabas, “Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor’’ (2000) 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 536. 
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applicable laws and procedures governing arrest and extradition.105 Nikolic asked, 
inter alia, that his arrest and detention be declared an abuse of process, and that 
the only appropriate remedy was dismissal and his return to Serbia and 
Montenegro. The case turned on the application of the legal doctrine of male 
captus bene detentus - i.e. whether lawful jurisdiction could be exercised over 
Nikolic’s unlawful arrest, or if the tribunal should decline to exercise jurisdiction 
on the grounds of an abuse of process.106 The ICTY Trial Chamber addressed the 
question of the extent to which it should it review the legality of Nikolic’s 
detention, even though the ICTY had no part in Nikolic’s questionable detention. 
Although the Chamber’s decision was far from perfect,107 it acknowledged that 
violations of Nikolic’s rights at the pre-trial stage could undermine the fairness of 
the proceedings and must be redressed as a matter of fairness:108 
“Ensuring that the Accused’s rights are respected and that he receives a 
fair trial form, in actual fact, an important aspect of the general concept of 
due process of law. In that context, this Chamber concurs with the view 
expressed in several national judicial decisions, according to which the 
issue of respect for due process of law encompasses more than merely the 
duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law also includes 
questions such as how the parties have been conducting themselves in the 
context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” 
The ICTY’s Appeals Chamber, however, was more concerned with asserting that 
the importance of achieving accountability for ‘‘universally condemned 
offences’’ as ‘‘a necessary condition for the achievement of international 
                                                
105 Nikolic´ and the Prosecution agreed to proceed with the motion on the basis of an agreed 
statement of facts, to the effect that: Nikolic´ had been abducted from the FRY by persons 
unknown, put into the trunk of a car and smuggled across the border into Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
he was then arrested uneventfully by an SFOR contingent; and, most notably, there was no 
connection between SFOR, the Prosecution and the abductors. 
106Ultimately, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that an abuse of process would only apply and 
terminate proceedings where the Accused had been subject to serious mistreatment, specifying 
that :“Whether such a decision should be taken also depends entirely on the facts of the case and 
cannot be decided in the abstract. Accordingly, the level of violence used against the Accused 
must be assessed. Here, the Chamber observes that the assumed facts, although they do raise some 
concerns, do not at all show that the treatment of the Accused by the unknown individuals 
amounts was of such an egregious nature.”Nikolic, ICTY Trial Chamber. 
107 For critical commentary, James Sloan, Breaching International Law to Ensure Its Enforcement: 
The Reliance by the ICTY on Illegal Capture’’ (2003) 6 YB. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 319. 
108 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 9 October 2002 (hereafter ‘‘Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber), 
para. 111. 
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justice.”109 The Chamber held that while certain human rights violations, such as 
torture, are of such a serious nature as to warrant dismissal, this remedy would 
“‘usually be disproportionate.’’ Based on the agreed facts, the Chamber found 
that Nikolic´ had not suffered such egregious treatment, and thus there was no 
basis for dismissal on this ground either. The Chamber added that its decision was 
based on a “balance” that needs to be struck between ‘‘the fundamental rights of 
the accused and the essential interests of the international community in the 
prosecution of persons charged with serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.’’110 
The language of ‘balance’ that the ICTY’s Appeal’s Chamber employed 
has immense rhetorical power, but, as Andrew Ashworth reminds us, it also 
imports “a kind of realism and pragmatism into arguments” that otherwise has “an 
unworldly absolutism.”111 The animus behind the ICTY’s decision regarding 
Nikolic, just like the ICTR’s regarding Barayagwiza, is an absolutist desire for, as 
the ICTY made clear, achieving accountability for universally condemned 
offences as a necessary condition for the achievement of international justice. 
This penchant for deontological denunciation, for removing the “filth” of 
(alleged) radical evil from our sight,112 is the polemic ‘norm’ that that has crossed 
over from the Hague and Arusha into Phnom Penh. There is no sign of a cross-
fertilization of international and local legal norms at the ECCC, as Laura 
Dickinson promised. The ECCC’s pre-trial courts negated these norms. Ironically, 
although UN negotiators sought to insulate the ECCC from local political 
interference, its legitimacy has been called into question by a selective application 
of international legal norms.  
 
VI. TRIAL AS DENUNCIATION CEREMONY 
 
My quarrel is not with the fact that alleged genocidaires are provisionally 
detained pending trial. I shed no tears for Duch, Nikolic or Brayagwiza when they 
were detained and I have a great deal of sympathy and respect for the victims who 
have suffered at the hands of regimes that they were associated with. My 
difficulty is that the norm that has penetrated the ECCC does not countenance 
tensions that arise between individual human rights and criminal responsibility. In 
fact, the ECCC’s November 2007 is reminiscent of the status denunciation 
                                                 
109 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest, Appeals Chamber, 5 June 2003 (hereafter ‘‘Nikolic´ (Appeals 
Chamber)), para. 26. 
110 Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), para. 30. For commentary, see Andrea Carcano, The ICTY Appeal 
Chamber’s Nikolic´ Decision on Legality of Arrest: Can An International Criminal Court Assert 
Jurisdiction Over Illegally Seized Offenders?’(2003) 13 ITALIAN YB. INT’L L. 77; 
111 Andrew Ashworth (1998), The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study, 2nd edn. Oxford: OUP. 
112 Mark J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt 150 (2001), 157. 
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ceremony that Harold Garfinkel described by reference to tribal practices.113 That 
ceremony is built around an absolute opposition between the tribe and perpetrator. 
To reconstitute the perpetrator as an ‘other,’ the denouncer must get a tribe of 
victims, the ‘same’, to see the characteristics of the perpetrator and the crime as 
extraordinary, in dialectical contrast to the tribe’s values. Delivering denunciation 
in the name of the tribe, the denouncer must shame the perpetrator as a monstrous 
outsider who lies beyond the line delineated by the tribe’s values. As Garfinkel 
puts it: 114 
“Both event and perpetrator must be removed from the realm of their 
everyday character and be made to stand as out of the ordinary…He [the 
perpetrator] must be placed ‘outside’, he must be made ‘strange.’” 
Garfinkel’s schema can be analogized to the deontological paradigm inherent in 
international criminal justice.115 Seen in this light, the ECCC’s pre-trial courts, 
taking on the role of denouncer, sought to make Duch the ‘outsider.’ As the 
‘outsider’, Duch was not entitled to insist on ordinary rights. He could not claim 
to be a victim, lest he upended the denunciation ceremony. He could not be heard 
to complain about what was done to him as that was not the denouncer’s concern. 
Similarly, the denouncer could not inquire into his values or interests, only those 
of the tribe’s. Applying Garfinkel’s schema to the ECCC pre-trial courts’ 
decisions, it is clear that these judges who were supposed to be guardians of the 
rule of law, did not apply the law or international standards of fairness as they 
were required to, but endorsed mob justice to appease victims and international 
justice affiliates. 
As we have seen, this impulse is indicative of a need to adumbrate the 
primacy of accountability. Ironically, it ignores the fact that for “international 
criminal justice to have any legitimacy, it must be enforced in a manner that 
comports with human rights standards—specifically, that the rights of the accused 
not be abused as part of the enforcement process.”116 The legitimacy of the Khmer 
Rouge trials require that an alleged genocidaire receives all the benefits of due 
                                                
113 In his seminal 1961 piece, “Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies”, American 
Journal of Sociology 61: 420-424, Harold Garfinkel presented a sociological analysis of ideal-type 
degradation ceremonies. 
114Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies, American Journal of 
Sociology 1961: 420-424, at p.422-3. 
115 See James Cockayne, Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes trials as 
Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies Journal of Human Rights, 4:455, 2005. Cockayne applies 
Garfinkel’s analysis to hybrid tribunals/ 
116 Robert J. Currie, “Abducted Fugitives Before the International Criminal Court: Problems and 
Prospects”, Criminal Law Forum (2007) 18:349–393, 372. 
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process and legality he himself denied to his victims.117 To treat a genocidaire 
otherwise than with fairness would result in the tribunal descending to the same 
level of disrespect for the rule of law and render the proceedings a show trial. 
It has been said that ‘‘society is the ultimate loser when, in order to 
convict the allegedly guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the 
law.”118 This statement is particularly apposite in Cambodia. Cambodia fares very 
poorly in international assessments of its human rights record, and in particular, in 
issues pertaining to law and order.119 Although Cambodia is a party to the ICCPR, 
its citizens cannot complain to the Human Rights Committee regarding non-
compliance, submission of such complaints being conditional on accession to the 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.120 Duch is not the only person in Cambodia 
who has been held in detention for protracted periods.121 International standards 
of fairness are honoured by other local courts more in their breach than in their 
observance.122 In short, fostering a rule of law culture in Cambodia is a long way 
away. For all its promise of internationalized justice, the ECCC’s pre-trial judges 
did not consider how their decision would augur for the future of Cambodian 
justice or jive with the ECCC’s own political history that was fraught with 
concerns regarding fairness and justice.  
 
 
                                                 
117 Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and Policing of 
the Past, “Journal of Law and Society Inquiry 20 (1995), p. 22. 
118 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (Ct. App. 2nd Circ., 1974), at 274. 
119 “US: Notorious Cambodian Police Chief in US for Counter-Terror Talks at FBI.” Human 
Rights Watch, 27 April 2007. <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/usint15717.htm> Also see: 
“Cambodia: After 10 Years, No Justice for Grenade Attack on Opposition.” Human Rights Watch, 
29 March 2007.  
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/28/cambod15587.htm> Also see the following for a full 
country report, 2006: http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/cambod14866.htm 
120 Cambodia signed the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, GA Res. 220A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 59, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, but 
has not yet ratified it . 
121 See e.g. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Cambodia 
(‘CAT Conclusions'), 5 February 2004, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/31/7, § 5; Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 2003/79 on Situation of human rights in Cambodia, 25 April 2003, § 13; and 
GA Resolution on Situation of human rights in Cambodia, 28 February 2002, UN Doc. 
A/RES/56/169. § III.1. 
122 The murder of labour union activist Mr. Chea Vichea and the questionable and much-reported 
detention of innocent suspects Mr. Born Samnang and Mr. Sok Sam Oeun in this case were 
reportedly attributable to a senior police officer who remains free and a close ally of the ruling 
elite. See “Cambodia: The Situation of Human Rights in 2006.” Asian Human Rights 
Commission, see: <http://material.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2006/Cambodia2006.pdf> Also see: Vong 
Sokheng. “Hun Sen’s Nephew still at large, as death toll climbs.” Phnom Penh Post, Issue 12/23, 
November 7 – 20, 2003. 
25
Mohan: Schisms in Humanitarianism
Brought to you by | Singapore Management University
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/3/17 7:49 AM
VII. COMMUNITY, COLLEGE 
To make matters worse, the ECCC’s pre-trial courts sought to pass their decision 
of as balanced and fair, which as Steven Heder reminds us, adds insult to injury 
for those Cambodians who seek to uphold these values.123 Heder’s comment 
brings the following question into sharp relief – in whose name is the ECCC 
seeking to detain and try Duch? It is convenient to say that Duch has been 
detained in the name of the locally afflicted community. Quite clearly, the 
ECCC’s pre-trial courts have sought to assuage Cambodian victims of the Khmer 
Rouge. Yet, the fact is that victims are, contrary to popular belief, not always 
assuaged by denunciation ceremonies.Vann Nath, a survivor of S-21 whom I 
referred to earlier, has said that he had mixed emotions after seeing his former 
tormentor Duch on trial: “'this is the day we have waited for 30 years. But I don't 
know if it will end my suffering.”124  
Further, victims, many of whom are unable to comprehend why an alleged 
genocidaire deserves rights, are not representative of the entire ‘local 
community’. Cambodians, as opinion surveys have found, espouse different 
values and have variegated expectations of the ECCC and what it should achieve. 
Several Cambodians, even in rural areas, have consistently favored a prosecution 
and trial of the Khmer Rouge that placed a high premium on international 
standards of justice because of their inherent mistrust of the Cambodian legal and 
judicial system and its well-known subservience to political masters.125 The 
Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (“CHRAC”), a coalition of 18 
Cambodian human rights groups, has maintained from the outset of the ECCC 
process that the UN should “refuse participation for any process which does not 
meet international standards.”126 Sonn Chhay, an opposition Member of 
Parliament, has also said that Cambodian activists “who fought for international 
standards in the court have resigned ourselves to the present court. Some are 
pessimistic, [saying] “forget about justice, a fair trial, and international standards: 
let’s just get it over with and out of the way.”127  
Similarly, the international community’s views regarding the ECCC’s pre-
trial courts have been divided. Not all are part of the ‘college’ of international 
                                                
123 Steve Heder, The Defendants, Justice Initiatives,  53, at 56: (“The most negative outcome 
would be if unfair proceedings take place but are declared to be fair: such an outcome would be 
deeply demoralizing for Cambodia’s dedicated fair trial advocates, some of whom regard the 
ECCC as offering the possibility of generating reform.”) 
124 Anger and pain at Duch's trial, Associated Press, February 17, 2009. 
125 See Laura McGrew, Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in Cambodia: 20 Years after the 
Khmer Rouge (February 2000). 
126 Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, press release, February 21, 2002. 
127“No Perfect Justice”: Interviews with Thun Saray, Son Chhay, and Ouk Vannath, Justice 
Initiatives, 112 
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justice affiliates. Human rights lawyers have argued that the ECCC, created as 
part of the domestic court system, has the same obligation as a Cambodian court 
to review and remedy due process violations against Duch128. Considered in this 
light, the ECCC’s “community”, the society in whose name it is supposedly trying 
the Khmer Rouge, is not a bi-polar one that can be neatly divided into 2 groups: 
national and international. It is a constellation of varied constituents, which 
includes victims, politicians, the UN, international and national commentators. 
They exist within the rubric of the national and international, but exert varied 
demands for justice that the ECCC, with its transformative goals, must take into 
account. Otherwise, the ECCC will be little more than revenge couched as a 
religious exercise of hope. 
The ECCC is, as James Goldston astutely notes, an unusual experiment in 
transitional justice that stands at the juncture of two distinct, if overlapping, 
politico-historical narratives.129 At one level, the ECCC marks a milestone in 
Cambodia’s tortured experience of violence and suffering—the first serious effort 
to bring the law to bear, however incompletely, on the crimes wrought by the 
Khmer Rouge more than a quarter century ago. At the same time, the ECCC is the 
latest in a series of tribunals—starting with Nuremberg and culminating most 
recently with the International Criminal Court—intended to secure legal 
accountability for mass atrocities and catharsis for its victims, but not always 
succeeding in this regard. In keeping with its purely international brethren, the 
ECCC’s pre-trial courts favored deontological denunciation and the need to 
secure legal accountability. In doing so, they ran the risk of distancing members 
of the local and international community who seek to hold the ECCC to its stated 
promise “of ensuring a fair and equitable justice system and, ultimately, 
reconciliation and stability.”130 Now that Duch’s trial has begun, telltale signs of 
Garfinkel’s denunciation ceremony have emerged. Cambodian Chief Co-
Prosecutor Chea Leang seems to have put on the garb of the denouncer, freshly 
                                                 
128 Anne Heindel, Amicus Curiae brief, In the Appeal of Duch against the CIJ’s Detention Order, 
October 4 2007 (“For eight years Duch has been held in detention without any apparent attempt to 
bring him to trial. He is not the only detainee in Cambodia who has been held for an extended 
period without process. It is essential to the legitimacy and legacy of the ECCC that it does 
everything in its power to ensure the rights of persons falling under its jurisdiction. By doing so, it 
can make a significant contribution to long-term reconciliation efforts in Cambodia, the scope of 
which extends far beyond the ECCC’s limited mandate and the short period of time during which 
it will be in operation.”) 
129 James A. Goldston, “An Extraordinary Experiment in Transitional Justice”, in Justice Initiative 
(2006).  
130 Preamble, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly – the Khmer Rouge Trials, GA 
Resolution A/RES/57/228, 27, February 2003 [the UN GA Resolution adopting the UN 
Agreement which created the ECCC]. 
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borrowed from the ECCC’s pre-trial courts. On the first day of Duch’s trial, she 
said:131 
“For 30 years, one-and-a-half million victims of the Khmer Rouge have 
been demanding justice for their suffering. For 30 years, the survivors of 
Democratic Kampuchea have been waiting for accountability. For 30 
years, a generation of Cambodians have been struggling to get answers for 
their fate…Justice will be done.” 
It is easy to say “justice will be done”. However, this statement begs the question 
- according to whose bidding? If the ECCC is serious about delivering justice, it 
has to begin to disentangle Duch’s case from the monochromatic rhetoric of 
international criminal justice. The Trial Chamber should consider several 
questions. Why did the Military Court detain Duch for all those years yet allow 
the other defendants to remain at large? Why was Duch offered up by the 
Cambodian government so readily when it has been reluctant to prosecute other 
former Khmer Rouge cadres who are equally, if not more responsible for mass 
crimes? What is the significance of Duch’s voluntary apology and confessions, 
especially since the other defendants have not been as forthcoming? What is the 
impact of victim testimony that portrays a picture of Duch as a garden variety 
criminal rather than a genocidaire or at least a person other than the savage 
moloch we have heard about?132 In short, the Trial Chamber should ascertain and 
consider the effect of the facts surrounding Duch’s case; not blindly preside over 
a denunciation ceremony. 
What emerges from this analysis of the ECCC’s pre-trial decisions in 
Duch’s case is that we need a new normative discourse of humanitarianism that 
does not simply preach, but grapples more seriously and carefully with the 
rationales for international criminal liability as a tool of human rights law 
enforcement. This discourse should recognize, as Jenny Martinez does, that in 
international criminal law, accountability and fairness are two separate strands of 
justice. Sometimes they move together in a positive direction, and other times 
there is a tension.133 This new discourse should respond in a principled way to 
these tensions. It should also be willing to explore, not fear, extra-legal strategies 
that focus on restorative justice rather than deontological denunciation as a means 
                                                
131 Cambodia victims 'demand justice', Al Jazeera, March 31, 2009 
132 Patrick Falby Khmer Rouge Prisoner defends jail chief, April 9 2009, AFP (“A French 
researcher who survived detention by the Khmer Rouge told a court on Wednesday that the 
regime's prison chief was not a monster, but instead was a revolutionary on a "mission".) 
133 International Criminal Law: A Conversation with Professor Jenny S. Martinez, The Stanford 
Lawyer, No. 74, 35 (2006). 
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of providing transitional justice and fostering the rule of law in Cambodia.134 








                                                 
134 See generally Dembour, Marie-Benedicte and Emily Haslam “Silencing Hearings? Victim-
Witnesses at War Crimes Trials” 15 EUR J INT’L L 151 (2004). 
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